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Health, and Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder
Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger, 
& Shane Glackin
AbstrAct: Externalist theories hold that a compre-
hensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be 
achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside 
of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully 
capture the complex dependencies that exist between 
an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, 
cultural, and material environment. Here, we first offer 
a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint 
can be understood, and unpack its commitments con-
cerning the nature and physical realization of mental 
disorder. Second, we apply a strongly externalist ap-
proach to the case of autistic spectrum disorder, and 
argue that this condition can be illuminated by appeal 
to the hypothesis of extended cognition. We conclude 
by briefly considering the significance this strongly 
externalist approach may have for psychiatric practice 
and pedagogy.
Keywords: Externalism, mental disorder, autism
Varieties of Externalism
A family of recent externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind argues that when attempting to explain the nature of 
psychological phenomena such as beliefs, desires, 
thoughts, emotions, and capacities of reasoning, 
we must attend not only to facts about the think-
er’s brain, but also to features of her embodiment, 
and to the rich and complex ways in which she 
is situated within a social and material environ-
ment. These approaches, which can be captured 
under the heading of “4E” cognition, treat the 
mind as something that is essentially embodied (a 
creature’s mental life is structured and governed 
by her physiological makeup as well as her neuro-
logical properties); embedded (a subject’s mental 
states unfold within a particular environmental 
niche, that includes various forms of material and 
informational scaffolding capable of supporting 
and enhancing her cognitive powers); enacted 
(thinking things are living things with a concerned 
perspective, who find and create meaning for 
themselves in the course of their ecological deal-
ings with their surroundings); and/or extended 
(the material underpinnings of an individual’s 
psychological states and processes can include 
resources that are physically located outside of 
that individual’s biological boundaries). Of course, 
some of these “Es” have more philosophically 
radical implications than others, and acceptance 
of one does not compel acceptance of all of the 
others. For example, the final “E”—the extended 
mind hypothesis—commits its proponents to the 
view that minds are literally spatially distributed 
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across brains, bodies, and the outside world; 
while the view that minds are embedded holds 
only that environmental resources provide an 
important structuring context in which cognition 
takes place. The approaches are united, however, 
by the guiding thought that a comprehensive ex-
planatory picture of the mind cannot be achieved 
by appeal only to facts expressed in the vocabulary 
of neuroscience, and that it is profitable to adopt 
a wider lens that recognizes that psychological 
properties belong to living things with embodied 
concerns, whose lives are conducted within highly 
organized social, cultural, and material settings. 
They are univocal in rejecting a purely internalist, 
neuro-centric model of the mental.
The question of whether this family of analyses 
can be applied fruitfully to the psychiatric domain 
has received comparatively little attention in the 
literature (but see, e.g., Cooper, 2017; Davies, 
2016; De Haan, forthcoming; Drayson, 2009; 
Glackin, 2017; Hoffman, 2016; Krueger, 2018; 
Krueger & Colombetti, forthcoming; Merritt, 
2013; Sneddon, 2002; Sprevak, 2011), and it is 
our intention in this article to lay the foundations 
on which such a project might be constructed, and 
to explore how externalist ways of thinking about 
mental illness and disorder1 might reconfigure 
some of the existing debates in the philosophy of 
psychiatry. Mental illnesses, too, belong to living, 
embodied persons who are embedded within an 
environment that is replete with informational 
resources and technologies, complicated inter-
personal dynamics, and sociocultural practices. 
Suppose that one were motivated to think—as we 
do—that explanations of mental illness pitched 
solely at the neurological level were apt to omit 
much of the complexity revealed by 4E approaches 
to the mind: how might this proposition be un-
packed, and what are its consequences?
We begin by presenting a taxonomy of pos-
sible varieties of externalism—that is, competing 
ways in which the claim that mental phenomena 
depend on external, non-neural considerations 
might be understood. These vary from the moder-
ate proposal that the symptoms of mental illness 
are especially likely to emerge when particular 
environmental conditions are met, to the stronger 
view that the material underpinnings of psychiatric 
phenomena are capable of including extra-bodily 
constituents. Rather than defending the general 
thesis that all varieties of mental disorder can 
profitably be explained in externalist terms, in the 
second half of the article we apply the conceptual 
resources of externalism to the case of autistic 
spectrum disorder (ASD), with the aim not only of 
illuminating this specific condition but of showcas-
ing the theoretical value of externalist thinking in 
the domain of mental disorder.
It is important to note first of all, that there are 
two possible explananda that an externalist ap-
proach to psychiatry might attempt to illuminate. 
Two ways, that is, of addressing the question of 
what a psychiatric condition is. There is, on the 
one hand, the explanatory task of determining the 
conditions under which it is intelligible and appro-
priate to attribute a mental illness or disorder to 
an individual. We can call this the status question: 
what must be true of an individual if she is to be 
reasonably attributed the status of having a par-
ticular psychiatric condition? In contrast, there is 
the question of where the material underpinnings 
of a mental state are to be found, and what their 
properties are. We can call this the constitution 
question: what is the physical basis for a person’s 
individual psychiatric condition, if there is one?
To see the distinction between these two ques-
tions, consider briefly how they apply to a com-
mon everyday object: a passport. Here, the status 
question and the constitution question permit of 
different kinds of answer. What gives the passport 
its status as a passport is its position within a web 
of social and legal conventions—it is a passport in 
virtue of entitling the bearer to international travel. 
What makes up the passport—its constitution—is 
the card, paper, ink, and so forth from which the 
item is made. In this sense, our answer to the 
passport-status question is externalist (it appeals to 
facts about the context in which the object is situ-
ated, without which it would not be a passport), 
while the passport-constitution question is given 
an internalist answer (it requires no more than an 
appeal to the material composition of the object).
The question of what a mental illness is divides 
along equivalent lines. First, there is the issue of 
what makes it the case that a person is, or is not, 
psychiatrically healthy—the facts to which we 
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must appeal in justifying a diagnosis of mental 
illness. Second, there is the issue of how that illness 
is manifested or realized in the world—facts that 
concern physical constitution. In the taxonomy 
below, certain externalist approaches are more 
naturally construed as answers to one or other of 
these questions, for the case of mental disorder. 
Moderate versions of externalism, we will see, 
can concede that although environmental or 
social considerations bear upon our answer to 
the status question, the constitution of a mental 
illness remains strictly inside an individual’s head. 
More radically externalist approaches, meanwhile, 
propose that both questions must be answered 
by ineliminable reference to extra-bodily factors.
Causal Externalism
The least controversial brand of externalist 
thinking that might be applied to psychiatric con-
ditions, we suggest, proposes only that an agent’s 
mental health causally depends on things that 
are located outside of her head. This is to hold 
simply that the events and states of affairs that 
an individual encounters over the course of a life 
can exert a range of effects upon her psychologi-
cal states—for instance, how she thinks and feels 
about a person or situation; how she is disposed 
to react to stimuli of different kinds; or the way 
she conceives of herself and her place in the world. 
Causal factors influence one’s psychiatric state 
from the outside in at least two ways—they can be 
responsible for the acquisition or development of 
a mental illness (as, e.g., in cases of post-traumatic 
stress disorder), and they can be responsible for 
the triggering of specific symptoms at a time (as, 
e.g., when a panic attack is brought about by a 
challenging social situation).
Causal claims of this sort are externalist in the 
sense that the explanation they offer of why a cer-
tain condition or symptom is manifested appeals 
to factors that lie outside of the subject’s biological 
boundaries. But such explanations are largely ag-
nostic in regard to both the status question and the 
constitution question. To say that an individual’s 
past experience has contributed to her current 
mental health, or that it has led to the manifesta-
tion of symptoms, is to say little about what it is 
for her to be mentally well or unwell, nor about 
the material underpinnings of her psychological 
condition. Causal externalism is consistent with 
an internalist answer to both questions; that is, it 
is consistent with saying that mental disorders are 
dysfunctions of the brain, and grounded wholly in 
neural properties. The only metaphysical commit-
ments of this moderate brand of externalism are 
the presupposition that psychiatric conditions can 
be influenced causally from outside of the subject, 
and that these impingements are broadly linear in 
character, such that causes can be distinguished 
from the effects that they precede.
Embedded or situated views of mental illness 
align with this form of externalism, in holding 
that a person’s psychiatric condition depends 
sensitively upon her environmental setting—for 
instance, the setting of the modern city, or the 
prison, or the classroom. Embedded theories of 
mind treat external states of affairs (such as where 
an individual lives; with whom she interacts; how 
her material habitat is structured) as explanato-
rily relevant to the psychological properties of an 
agent, without adopting the more radical view that 
the physical realizers of those mental features lie 
beyond the confines of the head. An externalist 
of this stripe can hold, for instance, that we can 
expect a greater preponderance of mental disorder 
under certain environmental conditions, or that 
there are particular contexts in which a symptom-
atology is likely to find expression.
Population Externalism
Second, it is possible to analyze a person’s men-
tal health in terms of that individual’s relation to 
the community or society in which they are locat-
ed, and the extent to which their psychiatric condi-
tion deviates from the norm. On a conception of 
this sort, a person is mentally unwell just when 
certain of her cognitive, affective or behavioral 
capacities fall short of a standard set by the wider 
population. A person has an anxiety disorder, a 
simple version of such a view would hold, just 
when they experience anxiety significantly more 
frequently, and to a significantly greater degree, 
than other members of their peer group (see, e.g., 
the biostatistical theory of disease in Boorse, 1975; 
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Boorse, 1977). The population against which 
normal performance is to be measured might be 
the general populace, or it might be a restricted 
subset thereof—for example, the population of 
children or adolescents, the population of drinkers 
or gamblers, and so forth.
An explanatory appeal to members of the popu-
lation in which an individual is situated counts as 
an externalist solution to the status question: what 
makes it the case that the individual has a mental 
disorder is that her condition fails to align with a 
standard that is set by factors located outside of 
her head. Were that standard to change for some 
reason (were the pattern of symptoms exhibited 
by the individual to become the norm), this form 
of externalism entails that the person would no 
longer be mentally unwell—even if all of the 
internal facts about her remained the same. One 
way to see the significance of this is to note that 
population externalism thus makes mental disor-
der entirely a matter of relational properties, and 
so uniquely susceptible to so-called “mere Cam-
bridge changes” (Guerrero 2010; cf. Geach, 1980, 
p. 321). That is to say, it is possible to change an 
individual’s status without changing the individual 
themselves in any way, simply by making sufficient 
changes to the other members of the reference 
population. To take a toy example; if one were 
to eliminate all low-anxiety members of society 
(by execution, for example, although the mere 
threat might suffice to make them anxious) then 
high-anxiety states would become the norm; indi-
viduals previously regarded as disordered would 
no longer have higher-than-normal anxiety, even 
if their anxiety level remained unaltered, since the 
norm had changed around them.
Population externalism is therefore silent on the 
constitution question. It is to say that some pattern 
of symptoms should be classified as a psychiatric 
disorder on the grounds that the manifestations 
in question diverge from those exhibited by the 
population at large; the view need not take a stand 
on whether those symptoms have a distinctive 
physical basis, nor whether such a basis would 
have to be neurally realized.
Two related points about population exter-
nalism are worth noting at this point, since they 
further differentiate it from the social externalism 
considered in the next subsection. First, propo-
nents such as Boorse claim it to be objective; 
although the selection of a reference class or the 
threshold for statistical significance might be re-
garded as arbitrary, it is thereafter purely an em-
pirically measurable matter whether an individual 
meets the relevant standard or not. Second, it is the 
statistical prevalence of the intrinsic properties of 
individual members of the reference class against 
which the patient’s own intrinsic properties are 
compared; group-level or emergent features are 
irrelevant to this form of externalism.
Social Externalism
An alternative externalist answer to the status 
question—that is, the question of which criteria 
must be satisfied for it to be appropriate to at-
tribute a mental illness to a person—comes in 
the form of social externalism. On this class of 
views, whether some cluster of symptoms counts 
as a manifestation of a particular mental illness is 
determined by the sort of emergent facts that lie at 
the level of society, and its members, conventions, 
and institutions, rather than of individuals.
Consider two simplified versions of this ap-
proach. According to the first, a person has a 
mental illness just when it is commonly accepted, 
within the practices and conventions of a par-
ticular society, that her symptoms characterize 
that illness. According to the second, it is the 
consensus judgment of a community of experts 
that determines this status: the person has the ill-
ness just when the medical profession is inclined 
to attribute it to her (e.g., Kukla, 2014).2 In both 
cases, what matters is how a social group thinks 
about, conceptualizes, and diagnoses a particular 
psychiatric condition, where these classificatory 
practices may be highly contingent upon cultural 
and medical-historical facts concerning the society 
in which they are enacted. That is, the attributions 
of mental illness made by a society or institution 
need not be objectively determined, but may reflect 
its customs, preferences, conventions, economics, 
folklore, religion, and so on—and also, more per-
niciously, its prejudices, biases, and stigmas (e.g., 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders’ classification of homosexuality as a 
mental illness until 1973).
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Social externalism is present, too, in theories 
that hold that the attribution of psychiatric ill-
ness is a normative as well as a descriptive matter 
(e.g., Reznek, 1998; Glackin, 2010, 2016, 2018). 
Suppose, for example, that we conceive of the 
symptoms of a particular mental illness as lying on 
a continuum with ordinary psychological phenom-
ena—say, that the subject of disordered anxiety 
undergoes an exaggerated form of normal anxiety, 
or that depression involves an inhibition or damp-
ening of normal emotional responses. In contrast 
with the position of population externalism, again, 
what counts as “normal” here is essentially evalu-
ative. The implication is that there is a threshold 
of anxiety, or a degree of emotional inhibition, 
that it is appropriate to pathologize, and thus to 
adopt as a target of treatment, intervention, and 
management. Identifying that threshold, whether 
this is carried out by the psychiatric profession, by 
the patient, or by society at large, involves making 
informed choices that have both a pragmatic and 
a moral dimension; choices concerning whether 
it is in the patient’s interests to pathologize a 
certain suite of symptoms; choices concerning 
the distribution of finite medical resources and 
care; and so forth. Similar choices must be made 
in deciding whether some behavior is the result 
of a weak or morally defective character, rather 
than being the symptom of poor mental health; 
whether behavior is criminal or clinically disor-
dered; etc. That is, the status of an individual as 
psychiatrically unhealthy, on approaches of this 
sort, is not to be determined simply by appeal to 
descriptive facts concerning her physical and be-
havioral symptoms. It is determined, instead, by 
the diagnostic and evaluative practices of a com-
munity, where privileges might be assigned to the 
practices of medical experts and clinicians (e.g., 
the harmful dysfunction analysis of Wakefield, 
1992; Wakefield, 2007).
Socially externalist views need not commit to 
a particular answer to the constitution question; 
indeed, they are consistent with a range of per-
spectives on what the underlying nature of mental 
illness is. We will briefly outline three of these, to 
give shape to the explanatory terrain.
The first way of thinking about the diagnostic 
judgments of psychiatric professionals is to treat 
them as tracking some real, underlying facts about 
pathophysiology; some internal, neural features 
that unify common sets of symptoms whenever 
they are found. According to this perspective—
known as the biomedical model of psychiatric 
illness—mental disorders are, at bottom, brain 
disorders (e.g., Insel & Quirion, 2005; but c.f. 
Engel, 1977). This strongly internalist answer 
to the constitution question is consistent with a 
social externalist approach to the issue of which 
sets of symptoms ought to be packaged together 
as the relevant objects of inquiry and interven-
tion. Suppose that symptoms A, B, and C are 
classified together as marks of schizophrenia, for 
example, and then mapped onto some underlying 
neural dysfunction. The initial classification of a 
syndrome (which answers the status question) can 
vary among social contexts, even when the facts 
about which brain states generate those symptoms 
(the answer to the constitution question) do not.
Secondly, however, it is open to the social ex-
ternalist to deny that the physical realization base 
of a mental illness is restricted to the neural. As 
we shall see, the final two varieties of external-
ism in the current taxonomy hold that—at least 
in certain cases—the material underpinnings of 
an individual’s psychiatric condition can include 
resources that are located outside of the head. 
These approaches represent a shift away from 
the “neurocentric” thinking that characterizes 
the biomedical model, and instead promote the 
idea that psychiatric phenomena are more widely 
constituted. We will unpack these options in the 
following sections.
Third, the social externalist might adopt a view 
of mental illness that is anti-realist or fictional-
ist, and deny that we should expect to identify 
any particular physical realization of psychiatric 
phenomena. On this view, diagnostic categories 
do not correspond to natural kinds with a mani-
festation in the brain or body, and terms like ‘bi-
polar disorder’ and ‘psychosis’ are systematically 
non-referring. Instead, they can be seen as labels 
that are overlaid upon (potentially relatively dis-
parate) clusters of behavioral symptoms that need 
not share an underlying neural basis. A radically 
anti-realist position is defended by Thomas Szasz 
(e.g., 1960, 2001), who argues that mental illness 
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is not physically constituted anywhere, because it 
is purely a social construct. It is open to the anti-
realist to accept that there may be pragmatic or 
clinical value in retaining the use of psychiatric 
classification and discourse, rather than rejecting 
it on the grounds of its failure to pick out physi-
cal kinds.
It follows from the availability of these three 
alternatives that the social-externalist principle 
that psychiatric classification and diagnosis is 
affected by the sociocultural context in which it 
transpires does not tie its proponents down to any 
particular metaphysical account of what it is—if 
anything—that constitutes mental illness. These 
three answers to the constitution question are 
all consistent with the guiding social-externalist 
thought that psychiatric classification can vary 
across different times, cultures, and environments.
Epistemic Externalism
The discussion of Social Externalism suggests 
another form of externalism. The brain represents 
something of a “black box” as far as functional de-
composition is concerned; its internal mechanisms 
are not directly perceptible in the way that those 
of the rest of the body are (Murphy & Woolfolk, 
2000, pp. 247-250). So someone might suppose 
that we can straightforwardly discern the purpose 
of a bodily mechanism such as the knee, or the ear, 
or the heart, by simply looking at it (although this 
claim is not uncontroversial!). However, this kind 
of reverse-engineering is certainly not possible for 
the brain, and so we cannot recognize most neural 
malfunction just by observing what it is that the 
brain is doing.
Now, suppose that all the other externalist 
accounts presented here are wrong, and that the 
biomedical model is correct; mental illnesses are 
entirely constituted, and given their status as 
illnesses, by neural malfunctions, perhaps even 
lacking external causes. How can we tell if such 
malfunctions are taking place? Not, remember, by 
simply observing the brain and its workings. Our 
only clue that something is going wrong at a neural 
level, even if we refuse it any explanatory role, is 
that something is going wrong at a surface level 
which we regard as a problem; the malfunctioning 
brain is producing behavior that we find inconve-
nient, embarrassing, disgusting, and so on. And 
these are inescapably external, social, judgments.
So a further sort of externalism is epistemic. 
Whatever disorders are like, ontologically speak-
ing, we can only recognize them—become aware 
of their existence in the first place, let alone dif-
ferentiate and understand them—by regarding 
them through the prism of their social significance. 
The point is not merely that neural malfunctions 
require external manifestation to come to our at-
tention, but that our criteria for identifying them 
are inherently social and evaluative, even if we in-
sist that the malfunctions themselves are localized 
and objective. And even where we do understand 
pretty well the neural mechanism involved in some 
cognitive process, it is typically because disvalued 
symptoms have caused us to go looking for it.
Vehicle Externalism
The hypothesis of extended cognition asserts 
that, when certain conditions are met, the physi-
cal underpinnings of an agent’s mental states and 
processes include not only neural phenomena, 
but also constituents of her material environment 
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008). A cogni-
tive system, on this view, is the kind of thing that 
need not be confined exclusively to the inside of 
an individual’s head—it can constitutively involve 
a dynamic coadunation of the living organism, her 
brain and body, and the material and information-
al resources with which she is closely integrated.3
A standard argument for this position proceeds 
by first identifying the functional properties of 
some mental state or process, and then showing 
that these functional properties can be instantiated 
by a system whose constituents span brain, body, 
and world. For instance, if memory is essentially 
the storage and retrieval of information, to which 
the agent has stable and fluent access, then readily 
available extra-neural resources such as note-
books and smartphones can be properly thought 
of as physical realizers of memory. Similarly, if 
arithmetical reasoning is essentially a capacity to 
manipulate numerical symbols to reach a prob-
lem solution, then the pen and paper on which 
an agent performs calculations can count among 
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the physical realizers of mathematical cognition. 
This is vehicle or realizer externalism: the things 
out of which a mental phenomenon is constituted 
are not simply neurophysiological—they are also 
extra-bodily, technological, artefactual. Were we 
to take those external resources away, it would no 
longer be the case that the person possesses the 
cognitive functions in question; not simply because 
those resources support or enhance her cognitive 
powers, but because they are—literally and not 
just metaphorically—part of what makes them up.
It is a typical commitment of extended mind 
theory that cognition has an essentially representa-
tional character.4 Beliefs, desires and so forth are in 
the business of representing the world as being one 
way or another, and cognitive processes such as 
thinking, reasoning, and planning are operations 
over these representations. This picture of mental-
ity holds that the subject’s cognitive and perceptual 
contact with the world is indirect, and mediated 
by intentional states that bear semantic properties. 
Vehicle externalism, then, is a thesis that concerns 
how such representations are realized, and which 
systems are capable of performing such opera-
tions. Otto’s notebook, in Clark and Chalmers’s 
classic defense of constitutive vehicle externalism, 
contains a representation of the location of the 
museum of modern art, and it forms a part of a 
hybrid Otto-notebook system that is capable of 
intelligently directing itself to that location.
The extended mind hypothesis, while contro-
versial, has been defended for a wide domain 
of psychological states and processes, including 
emotions (Colombetti & Roberts, 2015; Carter 
& Czarnecki, 2016; Krueger & Szanto, 2016); 
character traits (Alfano & Skorburg, 2017); 
conscious states (Rowlands, 2015; Vold, 2015); 
memory (Clark & Chalmers, 1998); and knowl-
edge (e.g., Brogaard, 2014; Carter & Czarnecki, 
2016; Hetherington, 2012). Mental illnesses that 
can be analyzed as disorders of these varieties of 
mental phenomena may thus be capable of be-
ing understood—according to this radical form 
of externalism—as belonging to systems whose 
constituent parts include more than just the brain. 
If thoughts and experiences can have material 
underpinnings that span the neural, the somatic, 
and the environmental, then there is little reason 
to believe that the same will not also be true of 
disordered patterns of thought and experience (see 
e.g., Sprevak, 2011).5
According to this brand of externalism, mental 
states and processes can be realized, as a matter 
of contingent fact, in systems whose constituents 
are both internal and external to the biological 
agent. That is, it holds that the functional proper-
ties that define some mental phenomenon can be 
instantiated in a variety of ways, sometimes by 
purely brain-bound systems and at other times by 
extended systems.
Importantly for our purposes, this is not the 
only possible externalist answer to the constitution 
question. In the next section—the final element in 
our taxonomy of externalist lines of thinking—we 
consider the proposal that there are psychological 
phenomena that are never internally realizable, but 
which instead are necessarily world-involving in 
nature. On this family of views, there are percep-
tual, cognitive, and emotional states that have a 
dynamic, relational character—they essentially 
involve a complex interplay between the biological 
agent and her material and social surroundings.
Relational Externalism
Outside of the psychological domain, there are 
many activities and processes in which we partake 
that have an essentially relational character. Be-
ing an instance of playing the piano, for example, 
necessarily involves the interplay between a person 
and the instrument; and likewise for driving a car 
or using a typewriter. Some of the things we do, 
like dancing a tango or shaking hands, entail the 
involvement of more than one person at a time. 
Phenomena such as these are relationally defined, 
in that they can be specified only by reference to 
multiple entities—here, a person and her interac-
tion with something external to her.
There are a number of ways in which psycho-
logical phenomena can be understood in relational 
terms, too. Naïve realist theories of perception, 
for example, hold that perceptual experiences are 
episodes in which unmediated sensory contact 
is instantiated between the subject and her sur-
roundings (e.g., Brewer, 2008; Fish, 2009; Noë, 
2004). Similarly, enactivist views treat cognition 
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as an activity of sense-making brought about in 
the course of the embodied agent’s interaction 
with her environment (e.g., Hutto & Myin, 2014; 
Varela, Thompson, E., & Rosch, 1991; Ward, 
2016). On these approaches, perceiving and think-
ing are never carried out in the head: instead, an 
individual’s mental life is understood as relation-
ally constituted. It comprises a suite of complex 
interactive phenomena that cannot be specified 
except by appeal to the living organism, her ex-
ternal habitat, and their coupled inter-dynamics. 
These relational views are thus strongly externalist 
about the physical basis of cognitive and percep-
tual states. Their position is that mentality is not 
located in, nor determined solely by, the brain. It 
occurs, instead, over the course of a living subject’s 
embodied interaction with the world around her.6
Relational accounts of the mental thus offer a 
strongly externalist perspective on how an indi-
vidual’s psychological capacities are constituted. 
Again, if it is possible to understand the mental 
phenomena that are implicated in psychiatric ill-
ness in such relational terms, then it will be pos-
sible that psychiatric illness is not only neurophysi-
ologically constituted. If we suppose, for example, 
that a mental disorder involves a disruption to the 
perception of affordances (as it is plausible to do 
for the case of utilization behavior or obsessive-
compulsive disorder (de Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof, 
& Denys, 2013), and the perception of affordances 
is not a neural but a relational phenomenon, then 
a strongly externalist picture emerges of the condi-
tion in question.
Externalizing Autism
We now apply this taxonomy to a particular 
case study, that of ASD, to illustrate how the cat-
egories we have outlined might earn their explana-
tory keep. After a brief characterization of how the 
status question should be understood in this case, 
we consider relational and vehicle externalism, and 
promote the latter as a candidate solution to the 
constitution question. As we have seen, these are 
the two strongest brands of externalism on offer 
in that both challenge the idea that the material 
underpinnings of an individual’s psychological 
condition are found entirely in the brain.
Autism: The Status Question
Recall that the status question concerns the 
set of conditions that must be satisfied for it to be 
appropriate to attribute a certain psychological 
state to an agent. Here, the question is that of 
when it is appropriate for a person to receive a 
diagnosis of autism, and whether and how this is 
to be distinguished from related categories such 
as social communication disorder.
ASD is generally thought to be a complex 
developmental disorder spanning a spectrum 
of social, communicative, imaginative, and be-
havioral abnormalities. ASD is diagnosed when 
a person exhibits some or all of a package of 
symptoms including non-verbal communicative 
deficits; repetitive behaviors; difficulties in adjust-
ing actions to suit a social context; fixated interest, 
especially in the sensory qualities of objects; and 
diminished imaginative capacities (e.g., absence 
of pretend play in childhood; Frith, 2003; Rutter 
& Schopler, 1987; Stone et al., 1997). In recent 
years, conditions such as Asperger’s and perva-
sive developmental disorder have been subsumed 
within the autistic spectrum.
A necessary condition for the diagnosis of ASD, 
according to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, is 
that symptoms of these kinds “cause clinically 
significant impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 21). A lack of a 
common measure of clinical significance, in com-
bination with the requirement that a diagnosis be 
applied when an individual’s capacities are dimin-
ished or abnormal relative to a wider population, 
entail that both population externalism and social 
externalism are at work here. Whether a person 
has ASD, that is, is determined by whether her 
community evaluates her symptomatology as caus-
ing significant impairment, relative to her peers.
Autism: The Constitution 
Question
We will not examine the status question fur-
ther for the case of ASD, and will accept for the 
remainder of the article that there are at least some 
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uncontroversial cases in which it is appropriate to 
diagnose this condition. It is the constitution ques-
tion that we turn to in this final section: what is 
the physical basis for autism, and is it to be found 
inside a person’s head?
Although there is little consensus about the 
material underpinnings of ASD, there are cur-
rently five “big ideas” (Frith, 2003), all of which 
are committed to an internalist solution to the 
constitution question.
i.  Theory of mind explanations argue that symptoms 
of ASD stem from a dysfunction of “mentalizing” 
modules in the brain, which impedes the individual’s 
ability to read others’ underlying emotions and 
intentions from their overt behavior (Baron-Cohen, 
1995).
ii.  Weak central coherence theory holds that symptoms 
result from neural deficits that lead to excessive focus 
on piecemeal details of objects, events, and contexts, 
coupled with a difficulty integrating these details 
into a meaningful whole or contextualizing gestalts 
(Frith, 2003; Happé & Frith, 2006).
iii.  Executive function theories argue that symptoms 
result from a dysfunction of frontal lobe activity 
responsible for executive control of behavior and 
attention (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; 
Russell, 1997).
iv.  The broken mirror neuron hypothesis states that 
social impairments in ASD result from a dysfunc-
tioning mirror neuron system, which is responsible 
for our ability to mirror the actions and behavior of 
others (Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006).
v.  The social motivation hypothesis argues that people 
with autism lack an inherent social drive that would 
lead them to exploit opportunities for developing 
their social competence (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, 
Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012).
Despite their differences, all five perspectives 
maintain that ASD is something realized entirely 
within a person’s brain. But there are reasons to 
be skeptical about this neurocentric individual-
ism. First, there are deficiencies with each of 
these big ideas (see, e.g., Boucher, 2012;; López, 
Leekam, & Arts, 2008; Mottron, 2011; Plaisted, 
Swettenham, & Rees, 1999; Frith, 2008). Second, 
each is likely on its own incapable of providing 
a comprehensive explanation of ASD (Gallagher 
& Varga, 2015; Happé & Frith, 2006). Growing 
evidence suggests that ASD is not a static condi-
tion determined by a single cause, but is rather a 
multidimensional phenomenon whose outcome is 
driven by the interplay of diverse factors operat-
ing at different time-scales (evolutionary, cultural, 
social, individual-psychological) and levels of 
description (biological, cognitive-behavioral, 
phenomenological, sociocultural) (Bolis, Balsters, 
Wenderoth, Becchio, & Schilbach, 2017; Kendler, 
Zachar, & Craver, 2011; Walter, 2013). Third, all 
of these big ideas show little concern for the em-
bodied and situated nature of the individual and 
thus fail to give interactive factors a significant 
explanatory role, which weakens their scope (De 
Jaegher, 2013; Hobson, 2002; Schilbach, 2016). 
This last point is particularly important. There is 
now growing sensitivity to the fact that ASD is 
characterized by distinct ways of perceiving and 
moving through the world, as well as expressing 
and sharing emotions (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 
2012). Externalist frameworks can help illuminate 
these aspects of ASD.
We are not the first to put forward an external-
ist approach to ASD. Hanne De Jaegher (2013) 
has recently characterized ASD in relational-
externalist terms. For De Jaegher, autism is char-
acterized by distinct styles of “sense-making,” or 
particular ways of perceiving, moving, emoting, 
and responding to the world. Social difficulties 
arise when autistic ways of sense-making are not 
responsively integrated with the sense-making 
practices of people without autism. And because 
sense-making is always a two-way process involv-
ing various forms of interpersonal coordination, 
it is essentially relational: embodied, active, and 
behaviorally engaged interaction between multiple 
individuals. Approaches that characterize root 
causal mechanisms of ASD in purely individualistic 
and neurocentric terms adopt an overly narrow 
perspective that overlooks the roles that both 
subjective and interactive factors play in shaping 
autistic forms of sense-making.
There is much to recommend De Jaegher’s 
relational-externalist account. In what follows, 
however—in the interests of further mapping the 
externalist terrain—we instead sketch a vehicle 
externalist account of autism. This account is not 
intended to be comprehensive; nor is it incompat-
ible with De Jaegher’s analysis. It is simply offered 
to draw attention to further ways externalist ap-
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proaches can enrich our understanding of autism 
(and other psychiatric disorders) by highlighting 
aspects potentially overlooked by neurocentric 
and individualistic perspectives.
ASD and Vehicle Externalism
As far as we know, there have so far been no 
systematic attempts to apply vehicle externalism 
to ASD.7 Recall that for vehicle externalism, some 
external resources become so fluently and deeply 
integrated into our everyday cognitive practices 
that we could not accomplish our cognitive goals 
without their ongoing input. How might this view 
apply to ASD?
Gallagher (2013; Gallagher & Crisafi, 2009) 
has recently defended a social form of vehicle 
externalism that can help to answer this question. 
Gallagher argues that “mental institutions”—legal 
systems, scientific research and experimentation, 
religious texts and practices, social scripts, and 
many other cultural practices and organiza-
tions—are (or at least can be) external vehicles 
of cognition. They function as what Humphreys 
terms “epistemic enhancers” (Humphreys, 2004). 
Sometimes they extrapolate an existing cognitive 
capacity, the way telescopes and microscopes 
bring far away or very small things into the 
range of visual detection, or computers increase 
the speed of our ability to perform mathematical 
calculations. Sometimes they convert phenomena 
accessible in one modality into a form accessible in 
another, such as sonar devices with visual displays 
or numerical results converted to graphical form 
(e.g., as in statistical analysis). And sometimes 
they augment cognition by furnishing access to 
novel abilities and/or features of the world that 
are otherwise beyond our reach.
Gallagher is primarily interested in the way 
mental institutions augment cognition. He argues 
that certain legal judgments, for example—like 
evaluating the legitimacy of a particular claim—
are only possible when individuals engage with 
artefacts and practices that make up the mental 
institution of law. This institution provides an 
array of external resources (contracts, systems 
of rights and laws, texts, technologies, norm-
governed procedures, and precedence) that enable 
individuals to manipulate and work through large 
amounts of empirical information they could not 
process without this external support. For Gal-
lagher, “these cognitive practices are such that in 
principle they could not happen just in the head” 
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 7). And he concludes that, if 
we are prepared to say that cognition supervenes 
on the vehicle of Otto’s notebook (Clark & Chalm-
ers, 1998), we ought to likewise grant cognitive 
status to mental institutions designed specifically 
to augment our cognitive capacities in certain 
domains (Gallagher, 2013, p. 7).
This is not the place to independently motivate 
Gallagher’s argument.8 We are instead interested in 
exploring how mental institutions may offer a way 
to think about ASD in vehicle externalist terms. 
Gallagher mainly focuses on large-scale mental in-
stitutions like legal systems and research practices. 
But norm-governed mental institutions regulate 
everyday life at a more local level, too, within the 
dynamics of ordinary face-to-face engagements—
and sometimes they “merely” extrapolate or con-
vert existing capacities, in addition to augmenting 
them. These different dimensions of mental institu-
tions and their transformative power speak to the 
multilayered complexity of our social life. More 
pertinent to present concerns, we suggest, is that 
thinking about mental institutions in local terms 
can help illuminate how mechanisms of autistic 
dysfunction may extend across both internal and 
external factors. Individuals with autism often lack 
fluent access to many local mental institutions that 
structure our everyday social interactions; they fail 
to develop the “psycho-practical know-how” (Mc-
Geer, 2001) needed to exploit the informational 
resources within these institutions. Accordingly, 
this lack of access impairs their overall social-
cognitive competence—much the way that Otto 
is cognitively impaired without reliable access to 
his notebook.
To see how so, consider first how much social-
cognitive work is accomplished not by in-the-head 
processes but rather by external practices designed 
specifically to make us intelligible to one another 
as social agents (Zawidzki, 2013). These external 
practices are epistemic actions (Clark, 1997; Kirsh 
& Maglio, 1994) that bring order to a messy and 
often unpredictable social world; their norm-gov-
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erned character reduces the descriptive complexity 
of the environment and simplifies computational 
demands by regulating our thoughts, dispositions, 
and behavior in socially recognizable ways. The 
character of these practices and institutions varies 
considerably depending upon time and place. And 
they are comprised of different techniques and 
strategies (imitation, pedagogy, norm construc-
tion and enforcement, narrative practices, etc.) 
and take many forms: playing chess; lining up in 
the queue to board a train; placing our menu on 
the table when we are ready to order; dressing up 
for an important interview; taking turns in con-
versation; creating improvised jazz music with a 
group; or expressing suspicion or disapproval via 
a well-timed eyebrow raise.
These practices—and the mental institutions 
they are part of—do social-cognitive work by 
predictably regulating our thoughts, feelings, and 
actions in ways that make us easier for others to 
understand. Consider playing chess. To play chess 
is to temporarily inhabit a norm-governed institu-
tion organized via a well-structured array of rules, 
practices, artefacts, and behavioral expectations. 
While part of this institution, we need not use 
some complex intracranial capacity to infer our 
partner’s desire to play chess and intention to do 
so fairly; we see it unfold directly in their playing 
as they continue to follow the rules, just as they 
see our desires and intentions in our chess-playing 
behavior. As chess players, we make ourselves 
intelligible to one another by conforming over 
time to the institutional practices, the rules and 
strategies, of playing chess (McGeer, 2015). Of 
course, either of us could fall back on our internal 
folk psychological resources to work out what the 
other is thinking and intending at any moment. But 
the point is that we do not have to. To use Hum-
phreys’ terminology, the local mental institution 
regulating this interaction converts a more difficult 
folk psychological task (inferentially attributing 
mental states) into an easier perceptual-motor task 
(jointly conforming our behavior to shared rules 
of chess)—and in so doing reduces the descriptive 
complexity of the environment by guiding our 
attention to salient bits of our partner’s norm-
governed behavior.
The broader point, then, is this: by habitually 
conforming our actions to these and other shared 
practices—and the larger institutions of which they 
are part—we let these external resources do much 
of the social-cognitive work for us. From this ex-
ternalist perspective, institutional factors beyond 
the individual must be included in our explana-
tion of social cognition. Many aspects of social 
understanding are done already and carried by the 
world, embedded in the norms and routines—the 
external vehicles—that regulate our interactions, 
and which have their social significance built into 
them (McGeer, 2001).9
ASD, Externalism, and 
Understanding Others
But why characterize our engagement with 
mental institutions as an embodied skill—a kind of 
“psycho-practical know-how,” as McGeer refers 
to it? For several reasons, all of which can help 
clarify how this vehicle externalist perspective can 
be applied to ASD.10 First, although the acquisi-
tion of this know-how can generate propositional 
knowledge (e.g., folk psychology), an individual’s 
ability to skillfully act in ways conforming to 
mental institutions is largely independent of 
the ability to articulate this knowledge. Young 
children—including prelinguistic infants lacking 
folk psychological competence—are responsive 
to culturally specific interactive norms governing 
early dyadic interactions (Krueger, 2013). And 
even if an individual possesses full propositional 
knowledge of institutional practices like playing 
chess or making office small talk, they can be more 
or less skilled in actually playing chess or mak-
ing small talk; embodied skills come in degrees. 
Second, conforming to norm-governed practices 
like playing chess, using a microscope to gather 
and analyze scientific data, or engaging in cocktail 
party conversation involves a rich array of sub-
sidiary competencies like visualization, imagina-
tion, higher-order pattern recognition, expectancy 
formation, and attunement to facial expressions 
and gestures. These embodied skills together shape 
our thought and action in institutionally compli-
ant ways. Finally, this know-how is characterized 
by practice-dependent epistemic gain. The more 
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we develop the relevant skills through practice, 
correction, and conforming to the examples set 
by others, the more we will understand what 
others are doing when they, too, conform their 
actions to the norm-governed mental institutions 
we jointly inhabit.
So how does all this apply to ASD? We suggest 
that mental institutions—understood as external 
social-cognitive vehicles—are relevant to autism 
in both a synchronic and diachronic sense. On 
a moment-to-moment basis, they provide tracks 
along which token episodes of social interaction 
run and acquire their normative character. But 
over time, repeated engagement with mental in-
stitutions also shapes long-term habits and skills 
that become part of our more general repertoire 
of embodied social capacities (i.e., our ability to 
smoothly negotiate different types of social situ-
ations). Crucially, people with autism lack fluent 
synchronic and diachronic access to the mental 
institutions of those without autism (“neurotypi-
cals”)—and without access to this external sup-
port, they cannot realize the epistemic gain that 
enables neurotypicals to understand one another 
as fluently as they do by becoming responsive 
participants within the same social game.11
There is ample developmental evidence that 
children with autism fail to develop the embodied 
skills needed to hook up with the mental institu-
tions of neurotypicals. Autistic individuals struggle 
with various aspects of social attunement: they of-
ten avoid direct gaze, have difficulty perceiving and 
decoding nonverbal cues found within facial ex-
pressions, gestures, and postures, and they struggle 
to connect and develop relationships with peers. In 
short, within ASD “nearly all behaviors necessary 
to establish and regulate social interactions seem 
to be impaired” (Gallese & Rochat, 2018). From 
an early age, many autistic symptoms—disinterest 
in living beings or social stimuli like voices and 
faces; lack of responsiveness to emotional displays; 
difficulties imitating others’ actions; preference 
for inanimate objects; diminished sensitivity to 
biological motion; trouble adapting to rhythmic 
turn-taking contingencies, and so on—impede 
social interaction long before the child is thought 
to acquire a (deficient) theory of mind (Dawson, 
Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; 
Hobson & Lee, 1998; Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008; 
Klin, Volkmar, & Sparrow, 1992; Trevarthen & 
Delafield-Butt, 2013). Crucially, there is also evi-
dence that while children and adults with ASD can 
imitate others’ goal-directed actions, they struggle 
recognizing and imitating the style of the action 
(Hobson & Hobson, 2008; Rochat et al., 2013; 
Wild, Poliakoff, Jerrison, & Gowen, 2012). The 
same gesture or action can be performed gently or 
forcefully, warmly or with an air of detachment, 
sincerely or ironically, depending on the context 
(i.e., mental institution) in which it occurs. Sensi-
tivity to the these expressive qualities of movement 
kinematics are important for understanding the 
emotions and intentions of others—and the ability 
to imitate these kinematics is a core skill needed to 
be responsively regulated by the different (local) 
mental institutions through which we move on a 
day-to-day basis.
In light of these considerations, there is a sense 
in which children and adults with ASD can be said 
to inhabit a different social world—understood 
as a collection of mental institutions—than do 
neurotypicals (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 
2003). However, to be clear, we are not suggesting 
that people with autism lack access to neurotypi-
cal mental institutions entirely. Clearly, they do 
have some degree of access to the latter. People 
with autism are part of our shared world and, to 
varying degrees, responsive to what others say 
and do. The point is that they have diminished 
practical fluency with these institutions, the way 
a non-scientist may lack practical fluency with a 
microscope or set of research practices and thus 
lack access to the cognitive benefits scientific tech-
nologies and practices confer.
However, it is important to note that in the case 
of ASD, this diminished access is symmetrical: 
people without autism likewise lack fluent access 
to the mental institutions of those with autism. 
A takeaway lesson from this externalist perspec-
tive on autism, therefore, is that characteristic 
social impairments are two-way impairments. 
Non-autistic persons have trouble perceiving 
and entering into the mental institutions of those 
with ASD every bit as much as they have trouble 
perceiving and entering into ours (McGeer, 2009, 
p. 310). An externalist approach to ASD can thus 
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help show how social difficulties in autistics are, 
in part, linked to interpersonal expectations of 
putatively normal expectation partners. It is tell-
ing, for instance, that high-functioning autistic 
people report that, despite difficulties interacting 
with non-autistic people, their interactions with 
other autistic persons are efficient and pleasur-
able (Schilbach, 2016). Factors such as these may 
have important consequences for thinking about 
intervention and therapeutic strategies.
Conclusion
Our primary interest in the article has been to 
map the landscape of externalist approaches to 
mental disorder: what does mean to say that a 
person’s psychiatric condition depends not only 
upon her neural state but upon the wider context 
of her social, material, and cultural environment? 
Two kinds of enquiry were distinguished—first, 
that of determining what makes it the case that an 
individual has a certain psychiatric status, such as 
being mentally healthy or disordered; and second, 
that of identifying the material substrate that un-
derpins or constitutes that status. Factors located 
beyond an agent’s head—such as the evaluative 
practices of the medical profession; the rate of 
symptom incidence in a population; or cultural 
consensus—can help to settle the former question. 
A subject is psychologically unwell, externalist 
perspectives of this sort will assert, just when she 
has a cognitive or emotional deficit that is statisti-
cally significant within a population, for example, 
or that members of a collective deem to involve a 
substantial impairment or deviation.
The 4E approaches to the nature of the mental, 
we have argued, provide a profitable theoretical 
foundation for an externalist treatment not only 
of the status question, but also of the constitution 
question. From the 4E family of views, a com-
prehensive explanation of the constitutive basis 
of psychiatric phenomena cannot be achieved 
unless our attention is directed beyond the neural 
and towards the embodied, social, cultural, and 
material setting within which individual subjects 
reside. Moderate externalist perspectives of this 
sort recognize that psychiatric symptoms might be 
best analyzed in terms of their essentially embod-
ied character—for instance, as deficits of practical, 
bodily skill, know-how, and coordination—or 
in terms of their being constrained, scaffolded, 
or otherwise shaped by the environment within 
which the agent is situated. Going a step further, 
socially oriented versions of the extended mind 
thesis, whose emphasis lies on the ways in which 
complex interpersonal forms of cognitive success 
are achieved through synthesis with spatially 
distributed resources such as artefacts and tools, 
props, shortcuts, and shared habits and routines, 
provide a framework for reconceiving the mate-
rial realizers of mental disorder. Symptoms of 
ASD, we have indicated, can involve a diminished 
degree of engagement and integration with those 
local mental and communicative institutions that 
enhance and augment a neurotypical person’s 
powers of social cognition. Just as Otto’s memory 
might be attenuated were he to suffer obstructed 
access to the stored contents of his notebook, so 
an impairment to an individual’s fluency in every-
day interpersonal forms of thinking might reflect 
a failure to successfully negotiate a distributed, 
participatory space of rule-governed practices, and 
a concomitant failure to exploit these resources’ 
cognitive potential. It is the complex, dynamic, and 
tightly integrated character of this kind of negotia-
tion, as it unfolds between persons and within a 
richly structured material habitat, that motivates 
us to resist the dyed-in-the-wool internalist’s view 
that it is the neural state of the subject alone that 
matters, constitutively, to her sociocognitive ca-
pacities. ASD, according to the vehicle externalist 
perspective, is not—or not simply—the result of 
neuronal dysfunction. It arises, instead, within 
an intricate, temporally and spatially extended 
context of which the brain is only a single part, 
and from which it cannot readily be extricated.
Lastly, let us turn briefly to the question of 
why such an externalist proposal might have sig-
nificance for psychiatric practice and pedagogy. A 
strongly externalist approach to psychiatric disor-
ders could, for better or worse, impact diagnostic 
decision making, reveal new types of treatment, 
enhance therapist empathy, reconfigure research 
priorities, and even change how psychiatrically 
affected individuals think about themselves and 
their possibilities for living (Hoffman, 2016, p. 
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1161). We conceive of these possibilities in terms 
of modifications of emphasis on the part of those 
who think about, live with, treat, or manage 
mental disorder. A de-emphasis of the neural in 
our frameworks for understanding the psychiatric 
domain might encourage a de-emphasis of forms 
of intervention, such as the use of pharmaceuti-
cals, that treat the brain as the principal locus of 
disorder. Techniques that focus, instead, upon 
improving awareness of one’s embodied relation 
to the world—such as interactive music therapy 
or cognitive behavioral therapy (e.g., Srinivasan & 
Bhat, 2013; Wood et al., 2009) —may be afforded 
renewed credibility. Such a shift of emphasis may 
yield an increased recognition of the importance 
of a subject’s psychosocial situation (her position 
within a web of interpersonal relations, hier-
archies, and conventions, and the impact these 
have upon her cognitive and affective condition), 
and of the need to guard against potentially del-
eterious consequences arising from ill-considered 
changes to this situation. And conceiving of mental 
disorder as something that arises within shared 
and participatory social spaces, and not simply 
within the neural structures of individual brains, 
may alter our perspective on who and what bears 
responsibility for psychiatric symptoms, and so 
effect changes in the self-conception of diagnosed 
persons. These are suggestive possibilities, whose 
details remain to be unpacked in future work. 
But they do indicate that externalist treatments 
of the status and material constitution of mental 
disorder are of more than academic interest—they 
direct our attention to matters of importance that 
lie beyond the confines of the brain, and enable 
a fuller understanding of the place of psychiatric 
phenomena within a sociocultural and material 
context.
Notes
1. We recognize that the medicalized language used 
in making psychiatric attributions can itself be contro-
versial and divisive. For present purposes, we will often 
speak of psychiatric or mental disorder, as a general, 
neutral term intended to capture a range of potentially 
diverse phenomena, including mental illness and ill-
health, and cognitive, behavioral, and developmental 
dysfunction. Where, for clarity and convenience, we 
choose to speak instead of mental illness, we do not 
intend to mark a substantial distinction between this 
and other forms of disorder.
2. Compare this view to the institutional theory of art 
(e.g., Dickie, 1974), according to which what determines 
an object’s status as an artwork is to be found not (only) 
in its intrinsic properties, nor (only) in its formal or 
sensory properties, but in how it is treated by members 
of ‘the artworld’—the community of qualified experts 
and the institutions in which they are embedded. The 
same object might be an artwork in one society, time, 
or place, and not in another.
3. The philosophical roots of vehicle externalism 
include work in cybernetics and systems theory, Gibson’s 
ecological psychology, pragmatism, and phenomenol-
ogy, all of which stress the importance of dynamic 
agent-environment couplings for understanding cogni-
tion. However, whereas these approaches tend to focus 
on low-level sensorimotor processes, an important 
contribution of vehicle externalist approaches like 
the hypothesis of extended cognition is to stress the 
central role sociocultural, material, and institutional 
resources play in linking neurobiology to higher cogni-
tive processes (Kiverstein, Farina, & Clark, 2013). We 
consider this idea in more detail in our discussion of 
“mental institutions.”
4. Although not all proponents of extended cogni-
tion endorse this claim. For example, Fuchs (2018) 
and Gallagher (2017) are both broadly sympathetic 
with extended mind-style approaches but nonetheless 
harbor reservations about the explanatory usefulness 
of “mental representations.” Additionally, so-called 
second-wave approaches to extended cognition (e.g., 
Sutton, 2010)—which move away from focusing on 
the functional parity of internal and external resources 
and instead focus on their mutual complementarity 
and integration—often downplay the need to appeal 
to mental representations in explaining cognition. This 
is a complicated issue that we cannot deal with here. 
Our use of vehicle externalism remains agnostic about 
the representational character of cognition. Although 
some cognitive states and processes likely do have a 
representational character, nothing in our discussion 
entails a commitment to the idea that all cognition is 
necessarily representational.
5. Sterelny (2003), for instance, raises the possibility 
that Otto will be susceptible to episodes of thought-
insertion and -deletion if other agents interfere with his 
notebook contents.
6. Consider, for instance, an ecological approach to 
sensory perception (e.g., Gibson 1966, 1979) according 
to which experiences of one’s surroundings involve the 
direct pickup of information concerning opportunities 
for behavioral engagement. In relational-externalist 
terms, this is to understand perception as an unmedi-
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ated encounter with affordances, which are the salient 
pattern of ways in which an object or feature can be 
acted upon by the agent, given her own embodied pow-
ers and skills. An experience of an affordance is not 
something that happens inside the perceiver’s head—it 
is the establishment of a particular relation between that 
subject and her surroundings. On a perspective like this, 
it is not the case that there are external entities that act 
as vehicles of a perceptual state that might have been 
realized by neural resources alone (contrary to the tenets 
of the extended mind hypothesis). Instead, the very 
nature of perception is reconceived as something that 
is essentially an embodied, active, behaviorally engaged 
relationship between subject and object.
7. Sneddon (2002) makes a few suggestive remarks 
in this direction but does not develop them in a sub-
stantive way.
8. For critical engagement with Gallagher’s view, see 
the articles in Merritt and Varga (2013).
9. This last point helps to distinguish a vehicle ex-
ternalist perspective from other approaches that might 
initially appear to advance similar ideas, such as Searle’s 
(1983) discussion of “the Background” or Husserl’s 
(1970) analysis of the “lifeworld”. Despite important 
differences that need not concern us here, both Searle 
and Husserl conceive of the Background and lifeworld, 
respectively, as preintentional—the collection of skills, 
habits, dispositions, and culturally established practices 
and meanings that makes intentional states possible. A 
vehicle externalist approach, in contrast, stresses the 
active, real-time role environmental resources play in 
driving and constituting cognition. We discuss this idea 
in more detail in the following section.
10. These points are taken from McGeer (2015, pp. 
261–262).
11. Sneddon gestures toward this idea when he says 
that, from a vehicle-externalist perspective, social diffi-
culties are “the result, in part at least, of an (intransitive) 
over-reliance on oneself and (intransitive) under-reliance 
on sociocultural aspects of widely distributed cognitive 
systems” (Sneddon, 2002, p. 309).
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